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Abstract 
This study examined the relationship between bank dividend policy and bank quality rating. Empirical evidence 
shows that bank management uses its dividend policy as a vehicle for signaling its financial health to the investing 
public. Using the regression models, this study showed that an inverse relationship exists between quality and 
dividends as a percent of earnings, because those banks like Zenith and UBA despite lower dividends as a percent 
of earnings exhibited better quality. The result clearly points to the facts that retained earnings are a key source of 
capital for banking institutions and that capital position provides information about institutional soundness or, 
alternatively, risk. This study also recommends that depositors, shareholders, and creditors can acquire information 
about the overall quality of a bank by examining both aspects of a bank’s dividend policy.  
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1. Introduction 
During the decade of the 198Os, the U.S. banking industry experienced a slow erosion in its financial health. While 
recent evidence indicates a reversal in the fortunes of the banking industry, long-term secular forces suggest a 
continued erosion in earnings in the banking industry and a greater potential for increased risk taking (Barth, 
Brumbaugh, & Litan, 1992). With the secular deterioration in the bank industry’s financial health, there was 
renewed emphasis on the recapitalization of the banking industry. The process has continued into the 199Os, with 
the industry’s capitalization ratio reaching its highest level in 30 years. 
The primary venue available for banks to raise capital is through retained earnings. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reported that in 1993, the banking industry paid out 50.7% of its earnings in cash 
dividends (FDIC, 1994). This is lower than the banking industry’s 80% payout rate in the first quarter 1991 but 
much higher than 27.5% payout rate in 1985 (FDIC, 1991; FDIC, 1985). Given this more recent liberal dividend 
payout ratio, especially in light of anticipated long-term decline in earnings, the ability of banks to expand their 
capital base must be questioned. 
A fundamental tension associated with bank dividend policy is thus apparent. As bank earnings are squeezed, 
banks must choose between maintaining stable dividend payments per share versus a constant dividend payout 
ratio from earnings. Both policy decisions can provide information about the existing and future soundness of the 
bank. Yet, there is some concern as to whether the financial markets incorporate this information. The financial 
literature is replete with studies which have examined the impact of dividends as an investor signal (Eades, 1982; 
Aharony & Swary, 1980). Generally, an unexpected increase in dividends is viewed as conveying positive 
information about the financial health of the firm while negative information about asset quality is imparted by an 
unexpected cut in dividends. According to Keen (1983), a central tenet of bank financial management is to avoid 
a cut in cash dividends because a dividend cut connotes a weakening in the soundness of a bank.  
Furthermore, Bhattacharya (1979) argues that due to informational asymmetries, cuts in dividends will have 
a greater negative impact on shareholder’s wealth than will positive effects associated with dividend increases. 
While cash dividends paid provides information about the future well-being of a bank, dividend payout as a percent 
of earnings (i.e., dividend payout ratio) also yields valuable information. Mayne (1980) points out that in the mid-
1970s retained earnings constituted 56% to 76% of the net growth in bank equity; currently, they represent about 
30%. One may hypothesize that changes in the dividend payout ratio can potentially affect the capital position of 
a depository institution, the ability of banks to meet new opportunities, and, foremost, the potential soundness of 
the institution. 
Ideally, if a bank increases its dividends, this should send a signal that management expects superior future 
cash flows. A high cash dividend indicates a reduced probability of failure, and this should improve the value of 
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, the dividend policy provides public information to the capital markets. 
Additionally, false signaling will be discouraged by the financial markets because this will lead to higher 
transaction costs since the bank’s cash flow will be insufficient to maintain its stated dividend policy. 
However, a potential problem of high dividend payouts from earnings may jeopardize the future safety of a 
bank. The dividend payout ratio should provide information about the safety of a banking entity. A managerial 
incentive model, developed by Bar-Yosef and Huffman (1986), indicates that there is an inverse relationship 
between the dividend payout ratio and risk. As risk increases, the dividends paid as a percent of earnings will 
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decrease. Thus, more earnings are being committed to improving a bank’s capital position. 
However, it is suspected that in the banking industry there is a direct relationship between the dividend payout 
ratio and risk. Additionally, since risk or quality is generally unobservable to the public, the causation of the 
signaling argument should run from the dividend payout ratio to risk, not vice versa as the managerial incentive 
model contends. 
Therefore, the signaling argument suggests a high dividend payout reflects an increase in the level of risk 
being assumed by a bank. Thus, both dividends paid per share and dividends as a percent of earnings provide 
signals to the capital markets concerning the soundness and safety of depository institutions. 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is not only to define a bank management’s dividend policy but also to 
describe the role of dividends payout ratio as a signal of market quality. Market quality refers to the future expected 
cash flow from an asset. 
 
2. Motivation and Hypotheses of the Study 
Prior literature on management disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001) suggests that disclosure decisions reflect both 
informational motivations (that is, managers use these decisions to inform financial statement users about the 
underlying economics of their firms) and opportunistic motivations (that is, managers use these decisions to bias 
users’ perspectives). Prior research on disclosure choices to emphasize financial performance metrics has generally 
focused on alternative settings, particularly pro forma reporting. A number of papers provide evidence consistent 
with management reporting in this context reflecting opportunism. Schrand and Walther (2000) examines earnings 
press releases, and documents that managers are more likely to separately announce a prior-period gain from the 
sale of assets than a loss, consistent with managers opportunistically selecting the prior-period earnings amount 
used as a benchmark to evaluate current-period earnings. Weiss (2001) examines the reporting effects of the 1993 
change in corporate income tax rates, and similarly finds that managers are more likely to separately disclose 
negative than positive non-recurring items in press releases, consistent with managers attempting to highlight the 
negative items as transitory or non-core expenses. McVay (2006) provides similar evidence, documenting that 
managers opportunistically shift reported expenses from core expenses (such as cost of goods sold) to special 
items, thereby overstating “core” earnings. Taken together, these papers suggest that managers use certain 
presentation decisions – particularly in the context of “pro forma” reporting – in an opportunistic fashion. 
Other research provides evidence that “pro forma” reporting reflects elements of both underlying economic 
performance and opportunistic behavior. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) finds that firms with low Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings 
consistent with motivations to accurately reflect the firm’s performance; however, the direction of the GAAP 
earnings surprise is also an important determinant of this decision, consistent with opportunistic motivations. 
Similarly, Bowen et al. (2005) provides evidence that managers emphasize metrics that portray more favorable 
firm performance; however, these same metrics are also more value relevant. While several studies provide 
evidence that investors are misled, at least temporarily, by such opportunistic presentation behavior (e.g., Schrand 
and Walther 2000), some research concludes otherwise (e.g., Johnson and Schwartz 2005). Bhattacharya et al. 
(2007) reveals that less sophisticated investors react to such pro forma disclosures, suggesting consideration of 
investor type may partially reconcile these differing conclusions. 
However, it is suspected that in the banking industry there is a direct relationship between the dividend payout 
ratio and risk. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the role of dividends payout ratio as a signal of 
market quality where market quality refers to the future expected cash flow from an asset. 
The following hypotheses were formulated to guide the researcher in achieving the objectives of this study; 
Ho1: There is no significant relationship between the assets and the dividends paid out ratio of the selected banks. 
Ho2: There is no significant relationship between the share capital to assets ratio and the dividends paid out ratio 
of the selected banks. 
Ho3: There is no significant relationship between the annual assets growth and the dividends paid out ratio of the 
selected banks. 
Ho4: there is no significant relationship between dividends paid out ratio and the quality of an institution. 
 
3. Methodology 
The empirical analysis used in this study differs from most studies concerning the information content of a bank’s 
dividend policy in three aspects. First, the data is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Second, this analysis is 
not an event study which examines the reaction of stock prices to changes in dividend policy. Third in this study, 
the key explanatory variable is dividend policy-that is, dividends paid out ratio (DPR). The signaling principles 
indicates that dividends should provide the relevant information about the future earnings of the bank and hence, 
the quality of the bank. So, one would hypothesize a positive relationship between dividends paid out ratio (DPR) 
and quality. 
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3.1 Formulation of Regression Model for Dividends paid out ratio 
Using sample data, model parameters can be estimated using the coefficients kbbbbb .....,,, 3210  of the 
regression equation, associating response variable Y with its control variables kxxxx ....,, 321 as shown below: 
kk xbxbxbxbbY ........3322110            (1) 
Where; 0b  is intercept of the model of the sample data, 1b  is regression coefficient associated with the control 
variable 1x  of the sample data, 2b  is regression coefficient associated with the control variable 2x  of the sample 
data and 3b  is regression coefficient associated with the control variable 3x  of the sample data. The regression 
models have been used in previous studies to examine rating schemes of bonds (Ederington, 1985; Farnham & 
Cluff, 1985). The control or independent variables in this study include a bank’s share capital to asset ratio (SCR), 
bank size as measured by total assets (AS), and the annual assets growth rate (AAG).  
 
The dividends paid out ratio (DPR) model can therefore be given as follows: 
AAGbSCRbASbbDPR 3210             (2) 
 
3.2 Data 
The data in this study were extracted from the annual reports of four selected banks listed on Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and the data covered a period of fourteen (14) years from 2005 to 2018. This period was chosen based 
on the fact that there was availability of data that are relevant in investigating the impact of dividend policy in 
signaling the quality of a bank. The four selected banks based on the availability of the relevant data include Zenith 
Bank Plc., United Bank for Africa (UBA), Access Bank Plc., and Sterling Bank Plc.  
Table 1: Data of selected variables for Access Bank Plc. 






Share capital to 
asset ratio (%) 
AAG 
(%) 
2005 174553.870 0.00 0.00 6,978,160 3.998 0.00 
2006 174553.870 0.07 0.00 6,978,160 3.998 0.00 
2007 328615.190 0.87 0.00 3,489,080 1.062 88.26 
2008 1031842.020 1.73 23.12 8,071,250 0.782 214.00 
2009 647574.720 0.05 1400 8,131,020 1.256 -37.24 
2010 726960.580 0.72 27.78 8,944,130 1.230 12.26 
2011 949382.100 0.76 65.79 8,944,130 0.942 30.60 
2012 1515754.460 1.57 38.22 11,441,460 0.755 59.66 
2013 1704094.010 1.15 30.43 11,441,460 0.671 12.43 
2014 1981955.730 1.75 20.00 11,441,460 0.577 16.31 
2015 2411944.061 1.74 17.24 212,438,802 8.808 21.70 
2016 3094960.515 2.21 18.10 212,438,802 6.864 28.32 
2017 3499683.980 1.77 22.60 212,438,802 6.07 13.08 
2018 3968114.608 2.54 15.75 212,438,802 5.35 13.38 
Source: Security and Exchange Commission (2010) and Access Bank Annual Reports 2005 to 2018 
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Table2: Data of selected variables for Sterling Bank Plc. 










2005 19435.29 0.0 0.00 2386.99 12.28 0.00 
2006 100664.43 0.09 0.00 5276.42 5.24 417.95 
2007 145974.67 0.06 0.00 5276.42 3.62 45.01 
2008 236502.92 0.52 19.23 6281.55 2.66 62.02 
2009 205640.83 0.53 0.00 6281.55 3.06 -13.05 
2010 259579.52 0.33 0.00 6281.55 2.42 26.23 
2011 504427.74 0.53 18.87 7851.93 1.56 94.32 
2012 580225.94 0.44 45.45 7851.93 1.35 15.03 
2013 707797.18 0.52 48.08 10796.41 1.53 21.99 
2014 824539.43 0.42 14.29 14396.21 1.75 16.5 
2015 799451.00 0.36 25.00 14395.00 1.80 -3.04 
2016 830803.00 0.18 0.00 14395.00 1.73 3.92 
2017 1068798.0 0.28 7.14 14395.00 1.35 28.65 
2018 1085876.0 0.33 0.00 14395.00 1.33 1.60 
Source: Security and Exchange Commission (2010) and Sterling Bank Annual Reports 2005 to 2018 
Table 3: Data of selected variables for Zenith Bank Plc. 
Year  
 






Share capital to 
asset ratio (%) 
AAG 
(%) 
2005 332885.00 1.36 51.47 3000.00 0.901 0.00 
2006 610769.00 1.91 57.59 4587.00 0.751 83.48 
2007 883941.00 1.89 52.91 4633.00 0.524 44.73 
2008 1680032.00 3.45 49.28 8372.00 0.498 90.06 
2009 1573196.00 0.73 61.64 12559.00 0.798 -6.36 
2010 1798679.00 1.06 80.19 15698.00 0.87 14.33 
2011 2169073.00 1.32 71.97 15698.00 0.72 20.59 
2012 2436886.00 3.05 52.46 15698.00 0.64 12.35 
2013 2878693.00 2.66 65.79 15698.00 0.55 18.13 
2014 3423819.00 2.95 59.32 15698.00 0.46 18.94 
2015 3750327 3.15 57.14 15698.00 0.42 9.54 
2016 4283736 3.62 49.72 15698.00 0.37 14.22 
2017 4833658 4.87 50.31 15698.00 0.32 12.84 
2018 4955445 5.27 47.44 15698.00 0.32 2.52 
Source: Security and Exchange Commission (2010) and Zenith Bank Annual Reports 2005 to 2018 
Table 4: Data of Selected variables for United Bank for Africa (UBA) 






Share Capital to 
asset ratio (%) 
AAG 
% 
2005 248928.00 2.49 24.10 1530.00 0.61 0.00 
2006 851241.00 1.86 53.76 3530.00 0.41 241.96 
2007 1102348.00 2.41 49.79 5748.00 0.52 29.50 
2008 1520091.00 3.05 8.20 8622.00 0.57 37.90 
2009 1400879.00 0.60 125 10778.00 0.77 -0.08 
2010 1432632.00 0.08 125 12934.00 0.90 2.27 
2011 1655465.00 0.51 9.80 16168.00 0.98 15.55 
2012 1933065.00 1.44 3.47 16491.00 0.85 16.77 
2013 2217417.00 1.41 35.46 16491.00 0.74 14.71 
2014 2338858.00 1.22 40.98 16491.00 0.71 5.48 
2015 2216337.00 1.36 29.41 18140.00 0.82 -5.24 
2016 2539585.00 1.31 41.98 18140.00 0.71 14.58 
2017 2931826.00 1.17 55.56 17100.00 0.58 15.45 
2018 3591305.00 1.20 54.17 17100.00 0.48 22.49 
Source: UBA Annual Reports 2005 to 2018 
 
4. Comparative Analysis of the Selected Banks 
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Figure 1: Assets (sizes) of the four selected banks compared 
 
 
Figure 2: Earnings per share of the selected banks 
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Figure 4: Dividends paid out ratio of the selected banks  
Difference was discovered between the mean earnings per share for the selected banks in Nigeria as shown 
in Figure 2. Also, the share capital to asset ratios are also different with the Sterling Bank having the highest 
followed by Access, UBA and Zenith Banks respectively as shown in Figure 3. 
The data in Table 1 indicate that Sterling and Access Banks are yet to recover from the global and local 
economic shocks of the mid-1990s to date. Additionally, Access Bank possesses higher dividend payout ratios 
than the industry norm as indicated in Figure 4. This higher dividend payout ratio may account for the lower market 
value capitalization position for depository institution, and it provides initial support for the lower assets or size of 
the bank. Additionally, it is possible that management was reluctant to reduce dividends (in the face of lower 
earnings per share) because of the negative effects of signaling. This indicates a strong positive association between 
these two variables, which are both used to measure bank soundness. So, the maximization of quality should be 
consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. 
 
5. Hypotheses Testing  
5.1 Testing model validity: for a relationship between Bank assets, Share capital to asset ratio, Annual assets 














This hypothesis is intended to test validity of the presence of a relation between dividends paid out ratio (DPR) of 
the selected banks and the independent variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then there are some independent 
variables that do actually affect DPR. 
 
5.2 Individual testing of coefficients of the multiple linear regression model: for any independent variable is as 
presented in equation 4. 
(4)0:0: 311310   DPRDPR HvsH    
The null hypothesis assumed that there was no statistically significant relationship between dividends paid out 
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5.3 Statistical Analysis Results and Hypotheses Testing 
Table 5: Regression results of Access Bank using Dividends Paid out Ratio (DPR) as a dependent variable based 
on the formulated model 








R2 0.215 Constant 
(b0) 
1.00 358.743 1.874 0.090 1.682  Mean 
0.00 
























Table 6: Regression results of UBA using Dividends Paid out Ratio (DPR) as a dependent variable based on the formulated 
model 








R2 0.004 Constant 
(b0) 
1.000 46.773 0.619 0.550 1.723  Mean 
0.00 






















Table 7: Regression results of Sterling Bank using Dividends Paid out Ratio (DPR) as a dependent variable based on the 
formulated model 








R2 0.149 Constant 
(b0) 
1.000 20.911 1.256 0.238 1.195  Mean 
0.00 
F-Statistic  0.681 AS (b1) 1.692 -0.018 -0.378 
 
 























Table 8: Regression results of Zenith Bank using Dividends Paid out Ratio (DPR) as a dependent variable based on the 
formulated model 








R2 0.498 Constant 
(b0) 
1.000 -1.054 -0.041 0.968 1.716  Mean 
0.00 























5.4 Analysis of the effects of assets, share capital to asset ratio and annual asset growth on dividends paid out 
ratio of Access bank Plc, Sterling bank, UBA and Zenith bank. 
The Access, Sterling, Zenith and UBA Banks data presented in tables 1 to 4 respectively were analyzed by using 
the relationship as stated by model for DPR as a dependent variable with the aid of Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS version 16.0). The results obtained for each bank are presented in tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. 
Testing the model, for Access Bank, from table 5 the coefficient of determination R2 was 0.215, for UBA (table 
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6), the R2 was 0.004, for sterling Bank (table 7), the R2 was 0.149 and for Zenith Bank (table 8), the R2 was 0.498, 
thus indicating that the regression control variables (AS, SCR and AAG) could account for 21.5 %, 0.4 %, 14.9 % 
and 49.8 % of the changes in the dividends paid out ratio of the Access Bank, UBA, Sterling Bank and Zenith 
Bank respectively. In addition to the co-efficient of determination is the adjusted R2, this means the coefficient of 
determination (R2) if adjusted from 21.5 % to -2 %, from 0.4 % to -29.5 %, from 14.9 % to 10.7 % and from 49.8 
% to 34.7 % could create more room or chances for other independent variables in the regression model, hence 
increase the line of fit of the model. To test for the individual statistical significance of the regression parameters, 
the T-statistic of the respective variables were used. The coefficients b0, b1, b2 and b3 shown in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 
8 are 358.743, -3.344E-5, -32.299 and -2.607 for Access bank model; 46.773, -2.200E-6, 6.703 and -0.014 for 
UBA model; 20.991, -0.018, -2.164 and -1.527E-6 for Sterling bank model; -1.054, 6.534E-6, 68.312 and 0.099 
for Zenith bank model. The results of the t- test indicated that regression coefficients b1, b2 and b3 were statistically 
significant and not equal to zero (as given by hypothesis ii) at 0.05 level of significance and 3:13 equal to 1.771 
(Neave, 1978). The decision rule for no autocorrelation in the residuals of the model is that the calculated DW 
value must be greater than DL (table value). Given that, the calculated DW statistic = 1.682, 1.723, 1.195 and 
1.716 for Access, UBA, Sterling and Zenith banks respectively while DL = 0.859 and DU = 1.848 Since K = 4 
variables and n = 14 years and at five percent level of significance, it can be concluded therefore that the models 
are free from autocorrelation of the residual. Co-linearity is the undesirable situation where the correlations among 
the independent variables are strong. The condition indices are 1.00, 1.821, 3.810 and 4.176 for Access bank 
model; 1.00, 1.906, 4.955 and 14.798 for UBA; 1.00, 1.692, 2.195 and 7.175 for Sterling bank model; 1.00, 2.256, 
3.485 and 27.173 for Zenith bank model as shown in tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. The results implied that 
there was no multi-co-linearity problem. From tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 the residuals’ average was zero with standard 
deviation of approximately 1.0 (0.816) implying that residuals were actually independent. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) of 2.219, 2.483 and 1.190 for Access bank coefficients; 1.514, 1.612 and 1.081 for Access bank 
coefficients; 1.141, 1.504 and 1.649 for UBA coefficients; 1.169, 1.734 and 1.952 for Sterling bank coefficients; 
6.761, 5.665 and 2.163 for Zenith bank coefficients showed that multi-colinearity was not a problem in this 
application (i.e. VIF < 4) (Neave, 1978), which clearly showed that AS, SCR and AAG were not significantly 
interacting factors.  
In testing the hypotheses earlier formulated, it is imperative to restate the hypotheses in both null and alternative 
form:  
Ho1: There is no significant relationship between the assets and the dividends paid out ratio of the  selected 
banks. 
Ha1: There is a significant relationship between the assets and the dividends paid out ratio of the  selected banks. 
To test for significant relationship of each independent variable, the T-statistic was used. The decision rule 
was that if the coefficient associated with any of the independent variable is zero while the T-table value is not 
equal to zero then the null hypothesis should be accepted, otherwise rejected and accept the alternative. At five 
percent level of significant, the table value is 1.771. Thus, since the regression coefficients associated with assets 
(AS) for all the banks were not equal to zero and the table value (1.771) was not equal to zero, the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the alternative accepted for the model (where DPR was the dependent variable). We can conclude 
that there is significant relationship between the size (assets) of the four banks and their dividends paid out ratio 
for the period of study.  
Ho2: There is no significant relationship between the share capital to assets ratio and the dividends paid out ratio 
of the selected banks. 
Ha2: There is a significant relationship between the share capital to assets ratio and the dividends paid out ratio of 
the selected banks. 
For hypothesis two, the regression coefficients associated with the share capital to assets ratio (SCR) for all the 
banks were not equal to zero and the table value (1.771) was not equal to zero for the model. Based on this, the 
null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative accepted. We conclude that there is a significant relationship between 
share capital to assets ratio and the dividends paid out ratio of the four banks for the period of study.  
Ho3: There is no significant relationship between the annual assets growth and the dividends paid out ratio of the 
selected banks. 
Ha3: There is a significant relationship between the annual assets growth and the dividends paid  out ratio of the 
selected banks.  
For hypothesis three, the regression coefficients associated with the annual assets growth (AAG) for the four 
banks were not equal to zero for the model. The implication is that annual assets growth was significant in 
explaining the variation in the dividends paid out ratio of the banks. We can conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between the annual assets growth and the dividends paid out ratio of the banks for the period of study  
Ho4: there is no significant relationship between dividends paid out ratio and the soundness/safety of an institution. 
Ha4: there is a significant relationship between dividends paid out ratio and the soundness/safety of an institution. 
With respect to the formulated model, assets size, share capital to assets ratio, annual assets growth and dividends 
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paid out ratio of Access bank are negatively correlated, which implies that increase in Access bank assets size, 
share capital to asset ratio and annual assets growth will decrease the dividends paid out ratio of the bank. The 
UBA share capital to assets ratio and dividends paid out ratio are positively correlated while the bank size, annual 
assets growth and dividends paid out ratio are negatively correlated. This implies that as the share capital to assets 
ratio of UBA increase, the dividends paid out ratio will also increase. But increase in UBA assets, annual assets 
growth will decreases the dividends paid out ratio of the bank for the period of study. The size of sterling bank, 
share capital ratio, annual asset growth and dividends paid out ratio are negatively correlated. The implication is 
that the DPR of sterling bank decreases with increase in bank size, share capital to assets ratio and annual assets 
growth. For the Zenith bank, its size, share capital to assets ratio, annual assets growth and dividends paid out ratio 
are positively correlated. The implication is that the dividends paid out ratio of the bank increases with increase in 
the bank size, share capital to assets ratio and annual assets growth.  Also, those institutions with lower share 
capital-to-asset ratios, moderate dividends paid out ratio in comparison with their assets like Zenith bank and UBA 
are better able to absorb losses and, hence, exhibit safer behavior. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there does 
not exist a relationship between bank soundness and the dividend payout ratio can be rejected. 
 
6. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This study examined the relationship between bank dividend policy and bank quality rating. Empirical evidence 
shows that bank management uses its dividend policy as a vehicle for signaling its financial health to the investing 
public. Using the regression models, this study found that an inverse relationship exists between quality and 
dividends as a percent of earnings, because those banks like Zenith and UBA despite lower dividends as a percent 
of earnings exhibited better quality. The result clearly points to the facts that retained earnings are a key source of 
capital for banking institutions and that capital position provides information about institutional soundness or, 
alternatively, risk. This study also shows that depositors, shareholders, and creditors can acquire information about 




As anticipated, dividends as a percent of earnings and quality are inversely related as seen in the case of Zenith 
bank; however, the coefficient is small. A potential reason for this outcome is that the banking industry is unique 
in that retained earnings provide significant information concerning the future capital position of the industry. 
Thus, as the dividend payout increases, the ability of an institution to expand its capital base is diminished, as is 
the quality or soundness of the bank. 
Therefore, while dividends per share is the dominant factor, it should not be considered in isolation. The 
investing public needs to weigh both aspects of a bank’s dividend policy when selecting an investment target. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
Depositors, shareholders, and creditors can acquire information about the overall quality of a bank by examining 
both aspects of a bank’s dividend policy (that is, dividends paid out ratio and dividends per share).  
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